

Disclaimer!

No physical touching during presentation will be demonstrated!
I promise!

Can I touch you there?

(Tools and Techniques for Security Testing)

Milan Gabor

/me

- Developer once
- Pen(tester) now
- Ethical Hacker
- Trainer
- Breaker
- BSidesLjubljana founder





<https://medium.com/that-conference/test-until-fear-turns-to-boredom-fac0793b847d>

FeedEX

WE HAVE
SO MUCH IN
COMMON

Our job is to tell you

**your baby
is ugly!**

-Software Testers- / pentesters



CURRENT STATUS:

standing on a line between giving up and seeing how much more I can take.


Don't they do testing?



Facebook says nearly 50m users compromised in huge security breach

 **Geeknik (👁) Labs**
@geeknik Following

Researcher prints 'PWNED!' on hundreds of GPS watches' maps due to unfixed API
zdnet.com/article/resear ...



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Technology

Ticketmaster admits personal data stolen in hack attack

Ticketmaster has admitted personal data was stolen in a hack attack, BBC understands

8,613 views | Sep 9, 2018, 01:00pm

380,000 Passengers Affected By 'Malicious' British Airways Hack



Jordan Bishop Contributor
Travel

380,000 British Airways passengers have been affected by a hack on the BA website and mobile app discovered on Thursday. According to the airline, both personal information, including passenger names and home addresses, as well as financial information, including credit card numbers, expiry dates and PIN codes, have been compromised. The breach comes just days after a similar attack on the airline's website.



Bank Security
@Bank_Security

Follow


The Vulnerability Epidemic in Financial Mobile Apps:

A researcher examined 30 financial apps for Android and found issues including exposed source code and leaks of sensitive data.

PDF Report:

info.arxan.com/rs/300-EOJ-215 ...

cc @mobilesecurity_ @LukasStefanko @JAMESWT_MHT




Lithuania reports rise in cyber attacks of high and medium importance

Xinhua
Thursday, March 7, 2019



The number of cyber incidents of high and medium importance in Lithuania increased by 40 percent last year, the country's Defense Ministry revealed in a report on Wednesday.



Hostinger's database of 14 million customers' info hacked



by RAVIE LAKSHMANAN — 7 weeks ago in SECURITY

45
SHARES



<https://tnw.to/umRzF>

Web hosting provider Hostinger has forcibly reset all of its client passwords as a “precautionary measure” following an unauthorized access of its customer database, which contains some 14 million users.

“During this incident, an unauthorized third party has gained access to our internal system API, one of which had access to hashed passwords and other non-financial data about our customers,” the Lithuania-based company said.



By William Suberg


MAR 21, 2018

Teenager Who Hacked Ledger Hardware Wallet Says Devices Still Vulnerable, Devs Deny

25657 Total views

341 Total shares

A 15-year-old programmer named [Saleem Rashid](#) discovered a flaw in the popular [Ledger hardware wallet](#) that allowed hackers to grab secret PINs before or after the device was shipped. The holes, which [Rashid described on his blog](#), allowed for both a “supply chain attack” – meaning a hack that could compromise the device before it was shipped to the customer – and another attack that could allow a hacker to steal private keys after the device was initialized.



Hardware wallet manufacturer [Ledger](#) continues to refute claims its devices can be compromised, a teenager said, [Ars Technica reports](#) today, March 21.



15-year-old Saleem Rashid [created code](#) to ‘backdoor’ Ledger’s wallets in November. In any released posts [describing](#) the events as “NOT critical” and [said](#) possible attacks “cannot extract the private keys or the seed.”

Overflow error shuts down token trading

John Biggs @johnbiggs / Yesterday

 Comment

A recently discovered programming error can make some crypto tokens susceptible to hackers. The exploit allows a hacker to pass an unusually high value to the exchange and get a ridiculous number of tokens in exchange, a problem that has caused the Okex exchange to shut down all token trading, including one called [BeautyChain \(BEC\)](#).

```
255 function batchTransfer(address[] _receivers, uint256 _value) public whenNotPaused returns (bool) {
256     uint cnt = receivers.length;
257     uint256 amount = uint256(cnt) * _value;
258     require(cnt > 0 && cnt <= 20);
259     require(_value > 0 && balances[msg.sender] >= amount);
260
261     balances[msg.sender] = balances[msg.sender].sub(amount);
262     for (uint i = 0; i < cnt; i++) {
263         balances[_receivers[i]] = balances[_receivers[i]].add(_value);
264         Transfer(msg.sender, _receivers[i], _value);
265     }
266     return true;
267 }
268 }
```

What's really interesting is how the hack worked. As you can see above, [a line in the smart contract](#) creates another value — amount — by multiplying `cnt` and `_value`. The hackers made a transfer and set the value to eight vigintillion — an eight with 63 zeroes. When this value is passed, the code overflows, allowing the hacker to gain a massive number of tokens. Thanks to the smart contract's “code-is-law” principal, each of these transfers are technically legitimate.

“There is no traditional well-known security response mechanism in place to remedy these vulnerable contracts!” wrote one [researcher on Medium](#). “With that, we further run our system to scan and analyze other contracts. Our results show that more than a dozen of ERC20 contracts are also vulnerable to batchOverflow.”

Results from our little research

- Analyzed web pentest results from last two years
- Compared those results with knowledge of juniors/newcomers
- Results
 - ~ 20% of issues can be easily detected by different tools
 - ~ 15% issues can be tested with no special tools, just browser
 - Majority severity issues are LOW, some MEDIUM

Security testing???

- It's like **almost** any other testing except with security and data integrity in primary focus
- You shouldn't be **afraid** and **have your mind open** for **new** things
- Think about **common** vulnerabilities and scenarios
- Use **tools** to help you! (you are used to use tools) ;)
- **Enjoy!**

Challenges of Security Testing

- Application Security testing
 - Identifying all **unintended** functions in the code
 - Testing using data that application is **not expecting**
 - Try to get **unintended responses** from the application
 - Identify some **unplanned workflows** in the application
- Not always **trivial** and **simple** task!
 - Sometimes ' character gives really crazy results

Software testers


Characteristics

- Motivations
 - Validation of correct execution
 - Repeatable and predictable evidence
- Skills
 - Deep understanding of actual usage
- Advantages
 - Can reach every function/action
 - Have test data for all cases
- Weaknesses
 - Focused on “happy path”
 - Little or no security expertise

Contribution to security


- Can exercise much more than any pentester
- Can provide logs, test data, test environment
- Can repeat security tests long after pentester are gone

Testers vs pentesters



Myth or truth?

Everyone who has
something to do with
SOFTWARE has something
to do with SOFTWARE
SECURITY!



KEEP
CALM
AND
TEST MY
HYPOTHESIS

My hypothesis!

Every software/hardware
tester should have
small/tiny
positive
“criminal”
mindset!

Think like a hacker!

- **Terminology**

- Defects known as vulnerabilities or vulns

- **Mindset**

- Program deviations, corner cases

- **Method**

- How to bypass or destroy things

- **Tools**

- Well known or private arsenal

- **Goal**

- Abuse, break, manipulate

Issues! Our own experience

- HTTP, secure cookies
- Password policies allowing to set password as “a”
- In local storage **admin=false** or other values
- User with **USER privilege** can create another user
- Insufficient validation and session issues (expiration)
- Old or even vulnerable libraries used
- Improper error handling
- Negative amounts!

**GET
INSPIRED
BY THESE
EXAMPLES**



Errors, strange disclosures. Easy to spot and find!

```
2015.11.23 16:10:29 Topshelf.HostFactory: Configuration Result:
"[Success] Name UltimaService
[Success] Description Ultima ERP Application Service
[Success] ServiceName UltimaService"
2015.11.23 16:10:29 Topshelf.HostConfigurators.HostConfiguratorImpl: "Topshelf" v"3.1.135.0", .NET Framework v"4.0.30319.42000"
2015.11.23 16:10:29 Topshelf.Builders.RunBuilder: "Running as a console application, creating the console host."
2015.11.23 16:10:29 Topshelf.Hosts.ConsoleRunHost: "Starting up as a console application"
2015.11.23 16:10:30 Server: Starting UltimaServer version 5.3.0.0...
2015.11.23 16:10:30 Server: Using runtime version 4.0.30319.42000.
2015.11.23 16:10:30 Server: Registering BLToolkit data provider...
2015.11.23 16:10:30 Server: Using data provider: OdpManaged
2015.11.23 16:10:30 Server: Connecting to database service: 127.0.0.1:1521/ULTIMA2C
2015.11.23 16:10:30 Server: Checking kernel version...
2015.11.23 16:10:32 Topshelf.Hosts.ConsoleRunHost: "An exception occurred"Oracle.ManagedDataAccess.Client.OracleException (0x80004005): ORA-1254
TNS: No listener ---> System.Net.Sockets.SocketException (0x80004005): No connection could be made because the target machine actively refused i
  at System.Net.Sockets.Socket.EndConnect(IAsyncResult asyncResult)
  at System.Net.Sockets.TcpClient.EndConnect(IAsyncResult asyncResult)
  at OracleInternal.Network.TcpTransportAdapter.Connect(ConnectionOption conOption)
  at OracleInternal.Network.OracleCommunication.DoConnect(String tnsDescriptor)
  at OracleInternal.ServiceObjects.OracleConnectionImpl.Connect(ConnectionString cs, Boolean bOpenEndUserSession, String instanceName)
  at OracleInternal.ConnectionPool.PoolManager`3.CreateNewPR(Int32 reqCount, Boolean bForPoolPopulation, ConnectionString csWithDiffOrNewPwd, S
  at OracleInternal.ConnectionPool.PoolManager`3.Get(ConnectionString csWithDiffOrNewPwd, Boolean bGetForApp, String affinityInstanceName, Bool
  at OracleInternal.ConnectionPool.OraclePoolManager.Get(ConnectionString csWithNewPassword, Boolean bGetForApp, String affinityInstanceName, B
  at OracleInternal.ConnectionPool.PoolManager`3.GetEnlisted(ConnectionString csWithDiffOrNewPwd, Boolean bGetForApp)
  at OracleInternal.ConnectionPool.OracleConnectionDispenser`3.Get(ConnectionString cs, PM conPM, ConnectionString pmCS, SecureString securedPa
  at Oracle.ManagedDataAccess.Client.OracleConnection.Open()
  at BLToolkit.Data.DbManager.ExecuteOperation(OperationType operationType, Action operation) in d:\Externals\BLToolkitGit\Source\Data\DbManage
  at Ultima.Server.Data.UltimaDbManager.OnOperationException(OperationType op, DataException ex) in C:\ULTIMA\Src\UltimaNext\Platform\Src\Serve
  at BLToolkit.Data.DbManager.ExecuteOperation(OperationType operationType, Action operation) in d:\Externals\BLToolkitGit\Source\Data\DbManage
  at BLToolkit.Data.DbManager.OpenConnection() in d:\Externals\BLToolkitGit\Source\Data\DbManager.cs:line 217
  at BLToolkit.Data.DbManager.get_Connection() in d:\Externals\BLToolkitGit\Source\Data\DbManager.cs:line 192
  at BLToolkit.Data.DbManager.OnInitCommand(IDbCommand command) in d:\Externals\BLToolkitGit\Source\Data\DbManager.cs:line 504
  at BLToolkit.Data.DbManager.GetCommand(CommandAction commandAction) in d:\Externals\BLToolkitGit\Source\Data\DbManager.cs:line 1969
```


Google!

Google

site:lv.lt lorem ipsum



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Settings

Tools

About 32 results (0,36 seconds)

policija.lv/lt/skelbimai/skelbimas-3

Mano vyriausybē

Ministras Pirmininkas

Vyriausybēs kancelarija

Ministerijas

Istaigos

E. pilietis

Nejgaliesiems

EN



Lietuvos policija

Paieška



Išplėstinė paieška

Naujienų prenumerata



Skelbimas 3

Titulinis ▶ Skelbimai ▶ Skelbimas 3

Konkursai pagal darbo sutartį

Galioja iki


2017-10-31

Donec mollis, justo vel eleifend porta, sem mi rutrum metus, mollis volutpat nibh nulla in enim. Quisque suscipit lobortis sem eu hendrerit. Proin sagittis vestibulum sem, vitae tincidunt libero blandit rutrum. Phasellus nec malesuada sem. Praesent sed fringilla lacus. Curabitur faucibus, sapien in luctus tempor, urna lacus dictum est, a bibendum ipsum quam ac eros.

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Sed et sem arcu, nec pretium odio. In ullamcorper, eros dapibus sollicitudin lacinia, ante turpis fringilla lectus, id dignissim nisi tellus ac tellus. Quisque a felis lacus, et euismod quam. Curabitur feugiat luctus euismod. In condimentum velit eu nulla mollis id vestibulum nisi rutrum. Morbi ut tellus augue. Pellentesque habitant morbi tristique senectus et netus et malesuada fames ac turpis egestas. Vestibulum et libero ut neque pulvinar egestas sit

Local storage

- Easy to spot
- No extra tools needed



Key	Value
satellizer_token	eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWwiOiIxliwiaWF0IjoxNDk2NDM1NDU
token	{"sub":"1","iat":1496435456,"exp":1497645056,"data":{"role":"admin"}}

Mobile app, 50k+ installs

196	http://[REDACTED]	POST	/database/[REDACTED].php	✓	200
197	http://[REDACTED]	POST	/database/[REDACTED].php	✓	200

Request Response

Raw Params Headers Hex

```
POST /database/[REDACTED].php HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 106
Host: [REDACTED]
Connection: close
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
User-Agent: okhttp/3.5.0
```

```
INSERT INTO [REDACTED]_messaggi (identificativo_dispositivo, messaggio) VALUES ('147258', 'testing message')
```

197	http://[REDACTED]	POST	/database/[REDACTED].php	✓	200
-----	-------------------	------	--------------------------	---	-----


Request Response

Raw Params Headers Hex

```
POST /database/[REDACTED].php HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 96
Host: [REDACTED]
Connection: close
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
User-Agent: okhttp/3.5.0
```

```
SELECT id_messaggi, messaggio from [REDACTED]_messaggi where identificativo_dispositivo = '147258'
```

THINK OUTSIDE THE BOX





Company Name

Travel Reimbursement

Employee Name*

First Name

Last Name

Employee I.D. #*

Travel Start Date*

Travel End Date*

Expense #1*

Cost #1*

Expense #2

Cost #2

Demo – manipulate app logic

Apple ▾ Proceed


```
Console Sources Network Performance Memory Application Security Audits Tamper EditThisCool
▼ <form method="POST" action="/warmup3/" name="lf">
  <input type="hidden" name="crypt_key" value="837ec5754f503cfaaee0929fd48974e7">
  ▼ <select name="chosen" class="select">
    <option value="1">Apple</option>
    <option value="2">Lemon</option>
    <option value="3">Mango</option>
    <option value="5">Orange</option> == $0
  </select>
  <input type="submit" class="button" value="Proceed">
</form>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
```

TOUCH ME!

- So what your title has to do with testing and testers???
- You need to start **touching** things **outside** of you **comfort/knowledge** zone!

Why?

- To make our (pentester) life **easier**, so we can **focus** on **real** issues!



Ask yourself a question!

WHERE DO I....

S₁

T₁

A₁

R₁

T₁

?

AppSec Testing 101

- Know at least some security **basics**
- There are plenty **resources** possible to find using Google
 - OWASP (web, mobile, IoT)
 - CWE (Common Weakness Enumeration) Classified application weaknesses
 - WASC (Web Application Security Consortium) – Threat classifications
- Get familiar with **Offensive** and **Defensive** Techniques
 - Mailing lists
 - Conferences – talk to people – **sharing is caring**

Really good start for web, mobile, IoT, ...




OWASP

Open Web Application
Security Project

OWASP cont'd

A Vision for OWASP



Fresh from the oven!



OWASP Global AppSec-Amsterdam 2019

2019-09-26 - 2019-09-27



Opening Remarks
- Global AppSec Crew



Attacking AWS: The Full Cyber Kill Chain
- Pawel Rzepa



Practical OWASP CRS In High Security Settings
- Christian Folini



The House Is Built On Sand: Exploiting Hardware Glitches And Side Channels In Perfect Software
- Herbert Bos



Controlled Mayhem With Cloud Native Security Pipelines
- Ben Pick




OWASP Based Threat Modelling: Creating A Feedback Model In An Agile Environment
- Chaitanya Bhatt

<https://administratior.video/edition/OWASP%20Global%20AppSec-Amsterdam/2019>

OWASP Testing Framework/guide

Every tester **should/must** be familiar with this! (only **224 pages**)

- 4.2 Information Gathering
- 4.3 Configuration Management Testing
- 4.4 Business logic testing
- 4.5 Authentication Testing
- 4.6 Authorization Testing
- 4.7 Session Management Testing
- 4.8 Data Validation Testing
- 4.9 Testing for Denial of Service
- 4.10 Web Services Testing



OWASP TOP 10

OWASP Top 10 - 2013	→	OWASP Top 10 - 2017
A1 – Injection	→	A1:2017-Injection
A2 – Broken Authentication and Session Management	→	A2:2017-Broken Authentication
A3 – Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)	↘	A3:2017-Sensitive Data Exposure
A4 – Insecure Direct Object References [Merged+A7]	U	A4:2017-XML External Entities (XXE) [NEW]
A5 – Security Misconfiguration	↘	A5:2017-Broken Access Control [Merged]
A6 – Sensitive Data Exposure	↗	A6:2017-Security Misconfiguration
A7 – Missing Function Level Access Contr [Merged+A4]	U	A7:2017-Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
A8 – Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)	☒	A8:2017-Insecure Deserialization [NEW, Community]
A9 – Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities	→	A9:2017-Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities
A10 – Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards	☒	A10:2017-Insufficient Logging&Monitoring [NEW,Comm.]



Admin

Lessons

- [X Cross Site Request Forgery](#)
- [X Failure to Restrict URL Access](#)
- [X SQL Injection](#)
- [X Insecure Cryptographic Storage](#)
- [X Insecure Direct Object](#)

References

- [X Insufficient Transport Layer](#)

Protection

- [X Broken Session Management](#)
- [X Unvalidated Redirects and](#)

Forwards

- [X Cross Site Scripting](#)

Submit Result Key:

Submit

What is SQL Injection?

Injection flaws, such as [SQL injection](#) occur when hostile data is sent to an interpreter as part of a command or query. The hostile data can trick the interpreter into executing unintended commands or accessing unauthorized data. Injections attacks are of a high severity. Injection flaws can be exploited to access any information held on the system and removing a system's confidentiality. These security risks can then be extended to execute updates to existing data affecting the systems integrity and availability. These attacks are easily exploitable as they can be initiated by anyone who can interact with the system through any data they pass to the application.

In the following form's parameters are concatenated to a string that will be passed to a SQL server. This means that the data can be interpreted as part of the code.

The objective here is to modify the result of the query with [SQL Injection](#) so that all of the table's rows are returned. This means you want to change the [boolean](#) result of the query's [WHERE](#) clause. The easiest way to ensure the [boolean](#) result is always true is to inject a [boolean 'OR'](#) operator followed by a true statement like `1 = 1`.

If the parameter is been interpreted as a string, you can escape the string with an apostrophe. That means that everything after the apostrophe will be interpreted as SQL code.

Hide Lesson Introduction

Use [SQL Injection](#) in the following example to retrieve all of the tables rows. The lesson's solution key will be found in one of these rows! The results will be posted beneath the search form.

OWASP ZAP

- Free proxy
- Portable – Java
- Simple to use
- Flagship product
- Point and shoot
- CI/CD ready
headless mode

The screenshot displays the OWASP ZAP web interface. The main panel shows a 'Welcome to the OWASP Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP)' message, a 'URL to attack' field containing 'http://www.owasp.org', and an 'Attack' button. Below this, the 'Progress' section indicates 'Spidering the URL to discover the content'. The bottom panel shows a table of scan results with columns for 'Method', 'URI', and 'Flags'. The progress bar at the bottom indicates 4% completion for the scan of 'http://www.owasp.org'.

Method	URI	Flags
GET	https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Mohd_Fazli_Azran	
GET	https://www.owasp.org/index.php/John_Vargas	
GET	https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1mO0e983giNVwhbuQ96cmb79t...	OUT_OF_SCOPE
GET	https://www.owasp.org/images/d/da/WASPY_2015_Sponsorship_Docume...	
GET	http://owasp.blogspot.com/2015/06/2015-waspy-award-nominations.html	OUT_OF_SCOPE
GET	https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?ik=f64bf2af68&th=14e21153b3fe690d&ui...	OUT_OF_SCOPE
GET	https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?ik=f64bf2af68&th=14e211c0353117cd&ui...	OUT_OF_SCOPE


ZAP with Jenkins

● 0 (0)
High risk

● 9 (-4)
Medium risk

● 34 (+6)
Low risk

● 2 (-3)
False Positives



Example Passive Scanner: Denial of Service

Denial of Service (DoS) is an attack technique with the intent of preventing a web site from serving normal user activity. DoS attacks, which are easily normally applied to the network layer, are also possible at the application layer. These malicious attacks can succeed by

[READ MORE](#)

Instances: 9

[HIDE](#)

URI: https://localhost.localdomain:443/management/location/embargo
Method: POST
Param: location

[SHOW MORE](#)

[COPY TO CLIPBOARD](#)

URI: https://localhost.localdomain:443/location/109.200.137.6
Method: GET
Param: location

[SHOW MORE](#)

[COPY TO CLIPBOARD](#)

URI: https://localhost.localdomain:443/management/location/embargo/exemption
Method: POST

OWASP Mobile Top 10 Risks

M1 – Weak Server Side Controls

M2 – Insecure Data Storage

M3 - Insufficient Transport Layer Protection

M4 - Unintended Data Leakage

M5 - Poor Authorization and Authentication

M6 - Broken Cryptography

M7 - Client Side Injection

M8 - Security Decisions Via Untrusted Inputs

M9 - Improper Session Handling

M10 - Lack of Binary Protections



OWASP TOP 10

INTERNET OF THINGS 2018

1

Weak, Guessable, or Hardcoded Passwords

Use of easily bruteforced, publicly available, or unchangeable credentials, including backdoors in firmware or client software that grants unauthorized access to deployed systems.



2

Insecure Network Services

Unneeded or insecure network services running on the device itself, especially those exposed to the internet, that compromise the confidentiality, integrity/authenticity, or availability of information or allow unauthorized remote control...



3

Insecure Ecosystem Interfaces

Insecure web, backend API, cloud, or mobile interfaces in the ecosystem outside of the device that allows compromise of the device or its related components. Common issues include a lack of authentication/authorization, lacking or weak encryption, and a lack of input and output filtering.



4

Lack of Secure Update Mechanism

Lack of ability to securely update the device. This includes lack of firmware validation on device, lack of secure delivery (un-encrypted in transit), lack of anti-rollback mechanisms, and lack of notifications of security changes due to updates.



Serverless what?

Intro: Welcome to Serverless Security

A1:2017 Injection

A2:2017 Broken Authentication

A3:2017 Sensitive Data Exposure

A4:2017 XML External Entities (XXE)

A5:2017 Broken Access Control

A6:2017 Security Misconfiguration

A7:2017 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

A8:2017 Insecure Deserialization

A9:2017 Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities

A10:2017 Insufficient Logging and Monitoring

- Back to Project
- Status
- Changes
- Console Output
- View Build Information
- Polling Log
- Checkstyle Warnings
- FindBugs Warnings
- Dependency-Check Warnings**
- PMD Warnings
- Duplicate Code
- Coverage Report
- Test Result
- Previous Build

Dependency-Check Result

Warnings Trend

All Warnings	New Warnings	Fixed Warnings
31	0	0

Summary

Total	High Priority	Normal Priority	Low Priority
31	8	22	1

Details

- Folders
- Files
- CWEs**
- CVEs
- Warnings
- Details
- High
- Medium
- Low

Category	Total	Distribution
CWE-20 Improper Input Validation	6	
CWE-200 Information Exposure	2	
CWE-255 Credentials Management	2	
CWE-264 Permissions, Privileges, and Access Controls	3	
CWE-287 Improper Authentication	4	
CWE-352	2	
CWE-399 Resource Management Errors	2	
CWE-74 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection')	1	
CWE-79 Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')	2	
Total	31	

Tools

- Browser – simple and effective, found on most OSes
 - Choose one that you like
 - Armor it with “hacking” add-ons
- Intercepting proxy is a must
 - OWASP ZAP
 - BurpSuite
 - Charles for Mac fans
- Mobile
 - Look into MobSF (Docker ready)
 - MOBEXLER (fresh VM from yesterday)

Some extra ideas!

- **Awake** that part of your **criminal** mind!
- Read through
 - Bug **bounties**
 - Hacking **walkthroughs** (Google IppSec on Youtube)
 - Check new **vulnerabilities** (ExploitDB)
- Get your **hands dirty**
 - Docker to the rescue

A collection of awesome write ups from best hackers in topics ranging from bug bounties, CTFs, vulnhub machines, hardware challenges, real life encounters and everything else which can help other enthusiasts to learn. #sharingiscaring

Featured story



Disclosure of Facebook Page Admin due to insecure tagging behavior

It was a sunny afternoon while I'm driving back home from attending our class in Masters at Holy Angel University, I saw something...

Aj Dumanhug
Sep 9

The banner features a dark blue background with a network of white dots and lines. In the center, there is a large, semi-transparent padlock icon. To the right of the padlock is a large, semi-transparent Facebook 'f' logo. The text is overlaid on the left side of the banner.

<https://medium.com/bugbountywriteup>

Hack The Box platform

Hack The Box v9.8.6

Donate BTC: 1AsDe8VjYFeP448NlQutnt8Nk2G88wYSuw :: IRC: irc.2600.net #hackthebox

Follow Like

Dashboard

Hack The Box

Hack The Box is an online platform allowing you to test and advance your skills in cyber security. Use it responsibly and don't hack your fellow members...

Hack The Box Dashboard v9.8.6

24 Machines ▲42%

73 Online Members

70 VPN Connections

45.1ms Response Time

2200 New Members
2379 Members ▲92%

Team

Team Rankings

HTB Network

Access

Machines

Social

Member List

Shoutbox

Forum

alitm27

ottosec

shotgunpayday

Arctic

Lame

Lame

Optimum

Arctic

Devel

Optimum

Devel

Avakoίvwη: Οι προκρίμ...

PENTESTIT

PENETRATION TESTING LABORATORIES

26825 REGISTERED

19 ONLINE

HOW TO CONNECT

SIGN IN

CYBERATTACK WORLD MAP

IP	Location	Port
5.18.251.X	St Petersburg, RU	80
85.233.65.X	Kazan, RU	8080
5.18.251.X	St Petersburg, RU	80
85.233.65.X	Kazan, RU	80
5.18.251.X	St Petersburg, RU	80
85.233.65.X	Kazan, RU	8080
5.18.251.X	St Petersburg, RU	80
85.233.65.X	Kazan, RU	8080
5.18.251.X	St Petersburg, RU	80
85.233.65.X	Kazan, RU	8080
5.18.251.X	St Petersburg, RU	80
85.233.65.X	Kazan, RU	80
5.18.251.X	St Petersburg, RU	80
85.233.65.X	Kazan, RU	80
5.18.251.X	St Petersburg, RU	80

JOIN THE LAB

CYBERATTACK ACTIVITY

Real skills necessary!

- **Damn vulnerable**

- Web application
- Fat application
- DIVA – mobile application
- Web services
- Router
- ARM router
- Serverless Application
- ...

Start practicing and if you fail, remember:

**Kartojimas yra mokymosi
motina**

Example - XVWA

- Real cases covered
- Easy start
- Easy setup
- One **Docker** instance for **multiple** hours of **fun!**

XVWA is designed to understand following security issues.

- SQL Injection – Error Based
- SQL Injection – Blind
- OS Command Injection
- XPATH Injection
- Formula Injection
- PHP Object Injection
- Unrestricted File Upload
- Reflected Cross Site Scripting
- Stored Cross Site Scripting
- DOM Based Cross Site Scripting
- Server Side Request Forgery (Cross Site Port Attacks)
- File Inclusion
- Session Issues
- Insecure Direct Object Reference
- Missing Functional Level Access Control
- Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
- Cryptography
- Unvalidated Redirect & Forwards
- Server Side Template Injection

OWASP Juice Shop

[Main](#) [Features](#) [Screenshots](#) [CTF](#) [News](#) [Sponsors](#) [Ecosystem](#)




owasp **flagship project** release **v9.1.2** GitHub ★ **2.5k** **Follow** **2.3k**

OWASP Juice Shop is probably the most modern and sophisticated insecure web application! It can be used in security trainings, awareness demos, CTFs and as a guinea pig for security tools! Juice Shop encompasses vulnerabilities from the entire [OWASP Top Ten](#) along with many other security flaws found in real-world applications!



88+ Hacking Challenges

Covering various vulnerabilities and serious design flaws



OWASP Juice Shop covers all vulnerabilities from the latest [OWASP Top 10](#) and more.


```
docker run --rm -p 3000:3000 bkimminich/juice-shop
```


#/viris[📧🔍🌐🔗]

More resources

- <https://ctf101.org/>
- <https://hack.me/>
- <http://vulnhub.com/>
- <https://www.hackthebox.eu/>
- <https://lab.pentestit.ru/>
- <https://www.blackmoreops.com/2018/11/06/124-legal-hacking-websites-to-practice-and-learn/>
- Google: free hacking training

Educate whole ecosystem!

- **Developers** – Software security best practices
- **Testers** – Methods for identifying vulnerabilities 
- **Security Professionals** – Secure Software development (SSDLC), Software coding best practices
- **Executives, System owners, etc.** – Understanding the risk and why they should be concerned and invest \$\$\$ to security testing too



**KEEP
CALM
AND
REPEAT
TEST**

FeedEX

New opportunities!

All Tech News > Security > Infosec 2017: Europe Needs 350,000 More Cybersecurity P...

Infosec 2017: Europe Needs 350,000 More Cybersecurity Professionals As Skills Gap Grows

Matthew Broersma ▾, June 6, 2017, 10:36 am

f

Europe faces a shortage of 350,000 IT security staff by 2022 – yet companies continue to focus on hiring workers with existing experience

1

Europe is expected to have a **digital security skills gap** of 350,000 by 2022, according to a new study, which urged firms to respond by broadening their hiring practices and investing in training.



Two-thirds (66 percent) of the European security professionals surveyed said there were **too few staff available** in their field, a proportion in line with the worldwide figure, which rose from 62 percent worldwide in 2015.

G+

Conclusions

- **Security** is (getting) an **issue!**
- You need to **reach out** from your **comfort** zone!
- **Touch, explore** and **play** with new things!
- Remember: **sharing** is **caring!**
- Join **meetups** or even **start** some!
- Use the OWASP **tools!** From **pros** to **pros!**
- Develop your **potential!** You can do **more!**

Do it with

PASSION

or not at all



